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[L. A.Xo. '25777. In Bank. July I, 1960.] 
REBECCA TYRE l't aI., Apprllants, v. AETNA LIFE 
INSURANCE C01'11' AXY ea Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Insurance Policies. 
-An insurnnre policy on the husband's life is community 
property when the prrlllimns have been paid with community 
funds. 
[2] Id.-Community Property-Disposition-Voluntary Transfer 
as Voidable.-A surviving wife Cllllnot avoid a contract entered 
into for 11 valuable consideration by her husband in the course 
of his lifetime management of the cOlllmunity personalty, 
though it was made without her consent and temporarily 
affected her control immediately following his death. 
[3] Id.-Community Property-Management and Control-Insur-
ance Policies.-A husband's election to have the proceeds of 
his insurance policy paid as an annuity instead of in a lump 
sum was not an exercise of his nontestamentary power of man-
I1gement of community property during his lifetime, but I1n 
attempt to dispose of proceeds after his death. Until he died 
he could elect to have the proeecds paid as a lump sum or as an 
annuity aetuarially worth that sum. 
[4] Insurance-Proceeds-Method of Payment.-As between an in-
sured husband and the insurer there was consideration for a 
change in method of payment where the husband elected to 
have the proceeds of his life policy paid as nn annuity instead 
of in a lump sum. The right to an nnnuity was consideration 
for surrender of the right to a lump sum payment. 
[5] Id.-Beneficiaries-Change of Beneficiary.-There is considera-
tion between nn insurer and the insured when the insured 
changes the beneficiary from one person to another. 
[6] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Property-Disposition-Vol-
untary Transfer as Voidable.-Though nn insurance contract 
provides that the insured husband has the right to change 
the beneficiary without the wife's consent when she is namcd 
[1] A pplication of comulUnity property system to problems 
arising in cOllnection with life insurance policies, notes, 114 A.L.R. 
545; 168 A.L.R. 342. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, 
§§ 28, 34; Am.Jur., COllllllunity Property, § 3;). 
[2] Sce Cal.Jur.2d, COllllllunity Property, § 72. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband und Wife, § 56; [2, 6, 12, 
13, 15] HIl~band and Wife, § 103(;) ; [3] Husbnnd and Wife, § 100; 
[4, 7] Insurance, § 219; (5) Insurance, § 225; [8-10] Husband and 
Wife, § 1-10: [11) Appeal nntI gnur, § 119; [14] Insurance, § 220. 
) 
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as such, any such ('hange of bencficiary without her consent anti 
without a valuable consideration other than substitution of 
beneficilll'ies is voidable, and after the husband's death the 
wife may maintain an action for her community share in the 
proceeds of the policy. 
[7] Insul'ance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries.-Although payment of 
life insurance proceeds is a matter of contract between the 
insured and the insurer, the immred's exereifle of his unilateral 
right under the contract to select the beneficiary is testamentary 
in character, a!'l is the exercise of his unilateral right under 
the policy to determine whether the proceeds shall be paid as 
a lump sum or in the form of an annuity. 
[8) Husband and Wife-Testamentary Disposition of Community 
Property.-Under Prob. Code, § 201, giving the husband testa-
mentary coutrol over only half the community property, the 
word "testamentary" is not limited to formal testaments. 
[9] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property.-AI-
though a wife· can set aside a husband's unauthorized gift of 
cOlllmunity property in its entirety during his lifetime, sh(' 
is limited to recovery of her half share after his death on 
the theory that his testamentary powers validate the gift of 
his half interest. 
[10] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property.-Just 
as the husband cannot deprive his wife of her community inter-
est by exceeding his testamentary powers to make gifts of 
more than half the cOlllIllunity property to third persons, so he 
cannot defeat her interest by making. a testamentary gift to 
her under conditions that restrict her management and control 
of the property. Her remedy in both situations is to disavow 
the gift and stand on her community rights. 
[11] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Where 
the facts are not disputed, an issue merely raising a new 
question of law may be considered for the first time by the 
Supreme Court on appeal. 
[12] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Disposition-Vol-
untary Transfer as Voidable.-When a husband attempts to 
dispose of his wife's share of the community property as well 
as his own, naming her as one of the takers, she must elect 
between her community rights and her husband's I("ift. If she 
accepts the gift, she must relinquish all inCl})lsistent claims. 
[1Sa, 1Sb] Id. - Community Property - Disposition - Voluntary 
Tra.nsfer as Voidable.-Where a wife was the sole primary 
beneficiary under her husband's life policy in which he exer-
cised his ullilutel"Ul right to change the method of payment by 
providing thnt the proceeds should be paid as an annuity 
instead of in a lump sum, the wife sufficiently elected to stand 
on her eOllimullity rights, thoug-h she prayed for half the fllce 
of the policy in c:\lIh anti the other half according- to her hus-
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band's plan j but by so electing she di:;qualified herself as th!' 
beneficiary of her husband's gift. though such disqualification 
did not remove her life as tIll' IIll'aSUrement for the annuity 
payable to the husband's donees. 
[14] Insurance - Proceeds - Persons Entitled. - If the primary 
bcnl'fieiary of a life insurance policy disqualifies himself, the 
proeel'ds are payable to the altl'rnate beneficiary, not to the 
insured's estate though the alternate beneficiary's interest was 
conditioned on surviving the primary beneficiary as well as 
the insured. 
[15] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Disposition-Vol-
untary Transfer as Voidable.-Undl'r a life insurance policy 
making thc insured's wife the sole primary beneficiary and 
providing that the proceeds should be paid as an annuity in-
stead of a lump sum, until the wife notified the insurer of 
her election to stand on her comlllunity property rights, the 
insurer was authorized to make payments in accordance with 
the terms of the policy, but the date she first demanded the 
payment of her cOIllmunity property interest in cash marked 
the commencement of her right to sbtutory interest on her re-
covery of her cOllllllunity property interest in the proceeds of 
the policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. l\IcIntyre Faries, Judge, Reversed with 
directions. 
Action to recover widow's eommunity property interest ill 
the proeeeds of a life insuranee policy. Judgment for defcnu-
ant reversed with direetions. 
'Vise man & Elmore and Aaron Elmore for Appellants. 
"William K. Young, Herman F. Selvin and Chapman, 
Frazer, Lindley & Young for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, the widow and three adult 
daughters of the insured, appeal from a judgment for rlefend-
ant ill an aetion to recover the widow's community properly 
interest ill the proeeeds of a life insurance policy. 
'l'he fads are not in dispute. Rebeeea Tyre (hereafter call('d 
plaintiff) and Louis Tyre, the insured, wcre married in Los 
AngPles in 1917 and lived there as hushanu and wife until 
Mr. TYl'e's death in 1957. Def('IH1aut issued its polil'~' ill 
the faee amount of $20,000 upon the lift' of tlw insul'('d ill 
1926. All the pr(,lllilllllS \\"('J'(' pail1 frolll \'OIllIllUllity fuuds. 
) 
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'fhe original belll'ill'iary was the 'fyre Brothers Glass COIll-
pany. ljPOll the immrcII's l'l'tircmcnt ft'om the bnsilH'ss ill 
1946, he elianl!t'd thl' benefit·jar.\, of the poli('~v to make it pay-
able to plaintiff ill a lump sum. In 1950 the insured exercised 
his option under the policy of selecting an alternate sl'ttle-
ment. He directed that npon his (}Path plaintiff receive an 
annuity based on her life expectancy at that time. If she 
failcd to survive him by 10 years, the monthly pa;nnents werc 
to be divided among the three daughters for the balanee of 
the 10-year period only. .As so amended the policy continued 
in force for the remaindf'l' of the insured's life and was in 
effect at his death. 
Plaintiff was 59 years and 8 months of age at the time her 
husband died. An average person of that age has a life ex-
pectancy, established by standard mortality tables, of 14 
years. Under the terms of her husband's choice of settlement, 
plaintiff will receiw $20,664 in installments of $123 per mouth 
if she lives out her full expectancy. If she fails to sUl'Yive the 
10-year period, defendant '8 total liability will be $14,760. 
To receive $10,000, plaintiff must survive 6.77 years. Plain-
tiff has suffered three heart attacks and the trial court found 
that her life expectancy may be less than that of an average 
person of her age. 
The insured changed the method of payment without plain-
tiff's knowledge or approval. Since the policy had been in 
the possession of a bank as collateral security for a loan, plain-
tiff did not learn of the change until a few months after her 
husband's death. She promptly disavowed his choice and 
requested payment of the face amount of the ol'i:!innl po1i~y 
in cash. Defendant refused to alter the method of settlement. 
Plaintiff and her daughters thf'reupol1 brought this action 
praying for $10,000 in cash representing plaintiff's community 
interest and a declaration that the remaining $10,000 be paid 
according to the influred's flelection at $61.50 per month. 
Defendant eOlltends that it is not obligated to pay any sum 
under the policy except $123 per month for plaintiff's life 
or 10 years, whichever is longer. 
[1] A policy of insurance on the husband's life is com-
munity property when the premiums have been paid with com-
munity funds. (N CIO Yorlc Life rll.~. Co. v. Bank 0/ Italy, 60 
Cal.App. 602, 606 [214 P. 61] ; Blethen v. Pacific Milt. Life 
Ins. Co., 198 Cal. 91, 99 [243 P. 431] ; (Jrilltnt v. (irimm, 26 
Ca1.2d 173, 175 [157 P.2d 841].) During the existel1ce of the 
marriage the respective interests of the hnshand amI wifc in 
J 
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l'ommUIl ity property lH'C lWt'SPllt, <'xist iug', alltl <''1uai (Civ. 
Codt" § 1 Gl a), but "the husban,\ has the munag'rlllPnt alltl 
control of the community lll'rSonai pl'Opl'rty, with lil,c ab8011ltr 
powcr of disposition, other than testamelltary, as he has of 
his srparate estate; proyi,Ied, however, that he cannot make 
a gift of sueh eOllllllunity personal property, or dispose of 
the sallle without a valuable considemtion, ... without tlll' 
written ('onsent of the wife." (Civ. Code, § 172.) \Vhell the 
community is dissolved by death, "one-half of the cOllunullity 
prop<'rty bL'longs to the surviving spouse; the other half is 
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent." 
_ (Prob. Code, § 201.) Both parties rely 011 these sections. 
Plaintiff contends that she became entitled, immediately upon 
hcr husband's death, to oue-half of each part of the eOlllmunity 
property. DL'fendant contends that the insured had power 
to enter into thc r;upplelllcntal cOlltl'aet by virtue of his gen-
eral powers of management and control and that plaintiff 
cannot disavow his contract. 
[2] Plaintiff could not avoid a contract entered into for 
a valuable consideration by her husband ill the course of 
his lifetime management of the community personalty even 
though it was made without her consent allu t<>mporarily 
affected her control immediately following hi,; death. Thus, 
in Beemer v. Rohc/', 137 Cal.App. 293 [30 P.2d 5471 (see also 
Beem.er v; Rake?', 137 Cn1.App. 298 l30 P.2d 549]), the hus-
band invested community funds in a saving,; and loan "ac-
cumulative investment certificate." The wife sought im-
mediate recovery of the entire sum and the trial court ordered 
payment" forthwith." On appeal the court awarded the wife 
her one-half commuuity interest in the sums evideneed by the 
certificate, but held that she was not entitled to immediate 
payment beeause her right to recover poss<'ssion was sub.iect 
to the same statutory provisions and writt<'u agreements that 
would have governed the husband in withdrawing the funds . 
.A relevant statute provided that holdt'rs of e('rtifieates in 
savings and loan institntions, including accumulative invest-
ment certifieates, might not be permitted to withdraw moneys 
without fi['st having' given a notice of intention to withdraw 
not less than 30 days nor more than six months previously. 
(Stats. 193], ch. 269, §§ 5.0](c), 6.01.) The hushand ent<>rl'tl 
into the investn1<'nt in thc normal course of hi,; lifetime mau-
agement of thc community personalty. Under the terms of 
his invesil1lf'lIt, the wifc',; manag<'Illf'lIt and control of Ilt'J' 
share or tlw cOllllllunity Pl'OPl'I·ty at h('[' hushand's tlt'ath 
) 
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coulll have been post po ned at most for six months. Anothcr 
type of Ii ret i Ille i livest men t that m igh t temporarily illlpedt~ 
distribution of the wife's cOllllllunity property interest is a 
partnership or family corporation arrangement providing 
for a windillg up period or an option in the surviving members 
to buyout the community interest. (See Wood v. Gunther, 
89 Cal.App.2d 718 [201 P.2d 874].) 
[3] In the present case, however, the husband's election 
to have the policy proceetIs paid as an annuity instead of ill 
a lump sum was 110t an exercise of his nontestamentary power 
of management during his lifetime, but an attempt to dispose 
of proceeds after his death. Uutil he died he could elect to 
have the proceeds paid as a lump sum or as an annuity actu-
arially "'orth that sum. [ 4] Of course, as between the 
husband and defendant there was consitIeration for the change 
in method of payment. The right to an annuity was consid-
eration for the surrender of the right to a lump stun payment. 
[5] Similarly there is consideration between the insurance 
company and the insured when the insured changes the bene-
ficiary from one person to another. [6] Nevertheless, it is 
settled that even though the insurance contract provides that 
the insured husband has the right to change the beneficiary 
without the wife's consent when she is named as such, any 
such change of beneficiary without her consent and without 
a valuable consideration other than substitution of bcneficiaries 
is voidable, anti after the death of the husband the wife may 
maintain an action for her community share in the proceeds 
of the policy. (Grimm v. Grimm, supra; Blethen v. Pacific 
Milt. Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 101; New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Bank of Italy, supra, at p. 607; Beemer v. Roher, 137 Cal. 
App. 293, 296-297 [30 P.2d 547] ; McBride v. McBride, 11 
Cal.App.2d 521, 523-524 [54 P.2d 480] ; Mundt v. Connecticut 
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 [95 P.2d 966] ; see 
Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 784-785 [158 P. 537].) 
[7] These cases recognize that although the payment of 
insurance proceeds is a matter of contract between the insured 
and the insurer, the insured's exercise of his unilateral right 
under the contract to seleet the brneficiary is testamentary in 
character. Similarly, the insured's exereise of his unilateral 
right under the terms of the policy to drtermine whether the 
proceeds !;hall be paid as a lump sum or in the form of an 
annuity is tpstamcntary in ('haraetrr. [8] Section 201 
of the Probate Code gives the hu!;band testamentary control 
over only olw-half of the ('Ollllllllllity }ll'oprl'ty, and the wor(] 
) 
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"testamentary" as used in that section is not limited to formal 
testaments. [9] Thus, although a wife can set aside a 
husband's unauthoriz('u gift of community property in its 
entirety during his lifetimc (Britton v. Hammell, 4 Ca1.2d 
690, 692 [52 P.2d 2211), she is limited to the recovery of her 
on<'-hal£ share after his death on the theory that his testa-
mentary powers validate the gift of his half interest. (Britton 
v. lIammell, supra; Lahalley v. Lahallc,II. 208 Cal. 323 [281 
P. 67], concurring opinion at p. 329; notl" 24 Cal.L.Rev. 306.) 
Similarly, a wife's gift causa mortis of community property 
(Odone v. 1IIar:occhi, 34 Ca1.2d 431, 439 [211 P.2d 297, 212 
P.2d 233,17 A.L.R.2d 1109]) and a husband's gift of a com-
munity life insurance poliq (JIaz1I!all v. Brown, 12 CaLApp. 
2d 272, 274 [55 P.2d 539]) have been uplll'hi as to the spouse's 
community int('rest h,v r('fer('nce to the t('stamentary power. 
[ 10] Just as the husband cannot deprive his wife of her 
community interest by exceeding his testamentary powers to 
make gifts of more than half the eommunity property to third 
persons, so he cannot defeat her interest by making a testa-
mentary gift to her under conditions that restrict her man-
agement and control of the property. Her remedy in both 
situations is to disavow the gift and stand on her community 
rights. 
Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff has chosen to 
accept her husband's gift of his one-half interest in the policy 
according to its terms and that she has thercby lost the power 
to set the policy aside as to her community interest. [11] De-
fendant has bcen permitted to raise this issue for the first time 
in this court because the facts are not disput<>d and the issue 
merely raises a new question of law. (Burdette v. Rolle/SOil 
Construction Co., 52 Ca1.2d 720, 725-726 [344 P.2d 307] and 
cases cited.) 
[12] Wh('n the husband attempts to disposc of his wife's 
share of the community property liS w('l1 as his own, naming 
her as one of the takers, she must ('1eet between 11<>r community 
rights and her husband's gift. (Estate of Wolf(" 48 Ca1.2d 
570, 574-575 [311 P.2d 4761 ; Estate of Jloore, 62 Cal.App. 
265,270-272 [216 P. 981] ; E.~tate of Ettlinger, 73 Cal.App.2d 
967,970 [167 P.2<1 7381.) If she accepts thc gift, she must 
relinquish all inconsistent claims. (Lauricella v. Lau1'icella, 
161 Cal. 61, 69 [118 P. 430} ; Ma:mall v. Broum, 12 Cal.App.2d. 
272,275-276 [55 P.2(1 5:191.) [13a] Under these cases an 
election is required herc. Plaintiff has elcct<>d to stand 011 
her community rights even though she prays for 11alf the 
) 
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cOllllllunity assrts uSNl to pUl'chase the anlluity in cash aud 
till' Othl'l' haH aCl'ortiing' to her hushand's plan. Plaintiff is 
the sole primary benl'fieiary under the policy. Only in the 
event that she fails to survive her husband by 10 years will 
the altl'mate brueficiaries have any claim to the proeeeds. 
l\IoreoYer, the alternate beneficiaries haye joined in the prayer. 
III this situation, unlike the Lauricdla and Mazman eases 
where the wife was only a partial beneficiary and the other 
beneficiaries asserted adverse interests, plaintiff sufficiently 
indicated her election by demanding her statutory share in 
cash and requesting her husband's share under his plan. 
Although plaintiff has not lost her right to set aside her 
husband's unauthorized disposition of her community interest, 
she is nevertheless not entitled to ree.eive his share under the 
terms of the policy. By electing to stand on her community 
rights, plaintiff has disqualified herself as the beneficiary of 
her husband's gift. [ 14] If the primary beneficiary of a 
life insurance policy disqualifies himself, the proceeds are 
payable to the alternate beneficiary and not to the insured's 
estate even though the alternate beneficiary's interest was cou-
ditioned upon surviving the primary beneficiary as well as 
the insured. (Beck v. West Ooast Life Ins. 00.,38 Ca1.2d 643, 
646-647 [241 P.2d 544, 26· A.L.R.2d 979].) The husband's 
share of the policy therefore became payable to the three 
daughters upon plaintiff's disqualification as primary bene-
ficiary. 
[ 13b] Defendant contends that e,'en if plaintiff is en-
titled to her share in a lump sum, the daughters should receive 
the monthly payments only for the 10-year period that meas-
ures the company's minimum liability under the policy. 
Plaintiff's disqualification as the primary beneficiary, however, 
dors not remoye her life as the measurement for the annuity; 
othrrwise, the husband's donees may be deprived of the benefit 
of hi"s investment. 
[15] Plaintiff seeks statutory interest on her recovery 
commencing 30 days after the date of her husband's death. 
(Civ. Code, § 3287.) Until she notified the eompauy of her 
election to stand 011 her community property rights, however, 
the company was authorized to make payments iu accordance 
with the terms of the polil·Y. (Blethcnv. Pacific 1I[/(t.' Life 
Ins. Co., HI8 Cal. 91, 101-102 [243 P. 431] ; Ins. Code, § 10172.) 
'fhc record docs not disclose the datc upon which plailltiIT 
first demanded the payment of her community property 
) 
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interest in rash. That date prop('rl~' llHtl'l,S tltl' eOJlllllencenH'llt 
of intcrest. 
The judgment is rc\'(>rsed and the trial eourt is ordered 
to enter judgment in acconlallce with thc views exprcssed 
herein. 
Gillson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, Dissellting.-Tll my view the opinion prepared 
for the District Court of Appeal by Justice Herndon and 
concurred in by Presiding Justice Pox and Justice Ashburn 
(reported in (Cal.App.) 1 Cal.Uptr. 563) adequately dis-
cusscs and corrcctly resoh'es the qil€'stions pre::;ented 011 this 
appeal. For the rcasons th<.'rein stated I would affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent 's l~titioll for a rl'll<.'aring was denied July 27, 
1960. Sehauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opiuioll that 
the petition should be granted. 
